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The international community has developed several different types
of legal regimes to govern natural resources. In general terms, these
include:
* according states exclusive permanent sovereignty over
natural resources, a system associated with territoriality;
* sharing resources, as in the cases of international rivers and
migratory species;
* recognizing common property rights, as in the case of the
high seas, where no one user has exclusive rights to
resources and no one can exclude others from exploiting
them, but capturing resources results in exclusive property
rights; and
* recognizing property as the common heritage of mankind -
or, to use a more contemporary phrase, the common
heritage of humankind (CH) - whereby all manage
resources and share in the rewards of exploiting them, even
if they are not able to participate in that exploitation.
In this essay I reflect on what has happened to the CH principle,
which underlies the last of these regimes. Several exemplary studies
have examined the evolution and content of the CH principle.'
* Roger J. Traynor Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. The author
thanks Professors Richard Finkmoore and Matt Schaefer for their helpful comments on a
draft of this essay.
1. See, e.g., KEMAL BAsLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998); VED P. NANDA & GEORGE PRING, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR THE 21sT CENTURY § 2.1.10 (2003); R.P. Anand, Common
Heritage of Mankind: Mutilation of an Idea, 37 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 1 (1997); Elisabeth
Mann Borgese, The Common Heritage of Mankind: From Non-living to Living Resources
and Beyond, in 2 LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 1313 (Nisuke Ando et al. eds.,
2002); Jan Brownlie, Legal Status of Natural Resources in International Law (Some
Aspects), in 162 RECUEIL DES COURS 249, 294-300 (1979); Vladimir-Djuro Degan, The
Common Heritage of Mankind in the Present Law of the Sea, in 2 LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE
SHIGERU ODA 1363 (Nisuke Ando et al. eds., 2002); Erik Franckx, The International
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Although I comment on the evolution of the principle, I also focus on
recent developments affecting its implementation and its possible
future.
Part II of this essay discusses what the CH principle means in
international law. This discussion involves three questions: To what
situations does the principle apply? What are its components or
elements? And what is its legal status? Parts III and IV suggest that
"context" is essential to understanding the CH principle, or indeed any
principle of international law. Part III places the CH principle, which
was promoted especially in the late 1960s and the 1970s, in historical
context. Part IV notes that the CH principle has been incorporated in
some treaties. The most notable of these is Part XI of the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("LOS Convention"), 2 as
revised by its associated 1994 Implementation Agreement, 3 concerning
seabed mining beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. An additional
development has accompanied the translation from principle to detailed
rule in the law of the sea: the practice of states and international legal
institutions has reinforced aspects of the CH seabed mining regime.
Finally, Part V of this essay evaluates the current status and
significance of the CH principle or concept. What, if anything, remains
of it?
Seabed Authority and the Common Heritage of Mankind: The Need for States to Establish
the Outer Limits of their Continental Shelf, 25 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 543 (2010);
L.F.E. Goldie, A Note on Some Diverse Meanings of "The Common Heritage of Mankind,"
10 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 69 (1983); Edward Guntrip, The Common Heritage of Mankind:
An Adequate Regime for Managing the Deep Seabed?, 4 MELB. J. INT'L L. 376 (2003);
Christopher C. Joyner, Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common Heritage of
Mankind, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 190 (1986); Alexandre-Charles Kiss, La Notion de
Patrimoine Commun de l'Humanitd, in 175 RECUEIL DES COURS 99 (1982); Bradley
Larschan & Bonnie C. Brennan, The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle in
International Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305 (1983); R. St. J. Macdonald, The
Common Heritage of Mankind, in RECHT ZWISCHEN UMBRUCH UND BEWAHRUNG:
FESTSCHRIFT FOR RUDOLF BERNHARDT 153 (Ulrich Beyerlin et al. eds., 1995); Arvid Pardo
& Carl Q. Christol, The Common Interest: Tension Between the Whole and the Parts, in
THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 643 (R. St. J. Macdonald &
Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983); Rildiger Wolfrum, The Common Heritage of Mankind, in
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, www.mpepil.com (updated
Nov. 2009; last visited Dec. 10, 2010); Rildiger Wolfrum, The Principle of the Common
Heritage of Mankind, 43 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VOLKERRECHT 312 (1983). These sources cite much additional commentary.
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter LOS Convention].
3. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, adopted July 28, 1994, 1836
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Part XI Implementation Agreement].
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II. THE COMMON HERITAGE PRINCIPLE
We can explore the meaning of any principle by considering three
questions. First, to what events or situations does it apply? That is,
with respect to the CH principle, what sorts of property or resources fall
within the scope of the principle? Second, what are the elements or
components of the principle, the features that give it content? And
third, what is its legal status? When we ask these questions about the
CH principle we discover that its meaning is less than clear, despite
several decades of use of the principle in international law.
The first question is perhaps the easiest to answer. States and
commentators have promoted the CH principle as applying particularly
to areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and to natural
resources found there. One early influential document was the
Declaration of Principles, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in
1970.4 Paragraph 1 of this Declaration provides that "[t]he sea-bed and
ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the area), as well as the
resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind."5 Article
136 of the widely adopted 1982 LOS Convention explicitly provides that
"[t]he Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind";6 the
Convention defines the "Area" as "the seabed and ocean floor and
subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,"7 and
"resources" are limited to "solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in
situ in the Area at or beneath the seabed, including polymetallic
nodules."8 Article 11 of the 1979 Moon Treaty, now in force for thirteen
states (albeit none of the space powers), explicitly incorporates the CH
principle.9 The principle has also been discussed in connection with
Antarctica,10 and some commentators have advocated applying the
4. Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the
Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, U.N. GAOR,
25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028, at 24 (Dec. 17, 1970) [hereinafter Declaration
of Principles].
5. Id. 1.
6. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 136.
7. Id. art. 1(1)(1).
8. Id. art. 133(a).
9. 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies art. 11, Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Treaty].
10. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/C.1/38/PV.2 (1983), 38th Sess., 1st Comm., Summary Record
of the 42nd Mtg. (comments of Mr. Abidin of Malaysia, urging that the "common heritage
approach . be considered in a future international design for Antarctica"). In 2005
Malaysia abandoned its efforts to promote more global and U.N. involvement in Antarctic
matters. See Marie Jacobsson, The Antarctic Treaty System: Legal and Environmental
Issues - Future Challenges for the Antarctic Treaty System, in ANTARCTICA: LEGAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE 1 (Gillian Triggs & Anna Riddell eds.,
2007).
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principle to other common space resources, including geostationary
orbit and high seas fisheries." In 1995 Malta invoked the CH principle
in proposing that the U.N. Trusteeship Council be transformed "from a
guardian of dependent territories to a body that acts as guardian and
trustee of the global commons and the common concerns in the interest
of present and future generations,"1 2 a proposal directed at conserving
the international environment.
Commentators and international organizations have also proposed
that a range of other, non-common space resources that are essential to
humans and of widely shared interest should be governed under a CH
regime. Such resources include, for example, rain forests, genetic
resources (even when found within national boundaries), cultural
heritage, and food. 13 However, the idea of applying the CH principle to
resources within the territorial jurisdiction of states has proved
controversial, and the principle has gained traction only with respect to
some common space resources, particularly deep seabed minerals in the
Area.14
Second, what are the elements of the CH principle? Features often
associated with it include:
* a prohibition of acquisition of, or exercise of sovereignty
over, the area or resources in question;
* the vesting of rights to the resources in question in
humankind as a whole;
* reservation of the area in question for peaceful purposes;
* protection of the natural environment;
* an equitable sharing of benefits associated with the
exploitation of the resources in question, paying particular
11. See, e.g., Kiss, supra note 1, at 145-64.
12. Letter from the Permanent Rep. of Malta to the United Nations to the Secretary-
General (June 2, 1995), U.N. Doc. A/50/142, at 3 (June 16, 1995).
13. See, e.g., PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
552 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing FAO Conf. Res. 5189 (1989), an Agreed Interpretation of the
International Undertaking, recognizing plant genetic resources as "a common heritage of
mankind to be preserved, and to be freely available for use, for the benefit of present and
future generations"); Borgese, supra note 1, at 1313-34; Kiss, supra note 1, at 164-96.
14. The International Law Association's influential 2002 New Delhi Declaration of
Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development categorized "the
proper management of climate system, biological diversity and fauna and flora of the
Earth" as "the common concern of humankind," while grouping "[t]he resources of outer
space and celestial bodies and of the sea-bed, ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction" as "the common heritage of humankind." ILA New Delhi
Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development,
Annex 1.3, in INT'L LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE SEVENTIETH CONFERENCE 22, 26 (2002)
[hereinafter ILA New Delhi Declaration] (emphasis added).
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attention to the interests and needs of developing states;
and
* governance via a common management regime.
The first two of these features relate to the juridical status of the
area in question. The first - prohibition on sovereignty - is not unique
to a CH regime: for example, it has long been accepted that no state
may exercise sovereignty over the high seas. The notion that rights
vest in humankind as a whole does, however, radically diverge from the
concept of high seas freedoms, which permits individual acquisition of
fish or other resources.
The next three features concern the utilization of the area and
resources in question. Some formulations of the CH principle explicitly
provide that protection of the environment entails a sharing of burdens
as well as benefits,15 and note that such protection involves an
obligation to take into account the interests of future generations.16
Because non-peaceful uses of an area could destroy its resources, the
peaceful purposes prong may also encompass concern with future
generations. The equitable sharing of benefits, implying distributive
justice, is the most novel and most controversial feature of the CH
principle. This element may imply a sharing or broadening of the base
of knowledge about resources. It also encompasses sharing the material
benefits or proceeds derived from exploiting resources. Opposition to
this benefit-sharing feature, as well as to the prohibition on
sovereignty, help explain why the CH principle has not been applied to
rain forests or other resources located within national territory.1 7
The last feature, governance through a common management
system, reflects the view that "humankind" as a whole is responsible for
managing the area or resource in question. The CH principle
anticipates the creation of appropriate institutional machinery or other
cooperative arrangements to implement such governance.
Although I assert that these features are "often associated" with
the CH principle, each of them has been subject to much debate. States
and commentators disagree about several components of the CH
principle. A few examples provide a sense of the discourse:
Juridical Status. The United States has historically argued that
the CH principle is simply another verbal formulation of a freedoms
regime, under which no country has sovereignty over a common space
but may acquire exclusive property rights in its resources.18 Professor
15. BASLAR, supra note 1, at 99-103.
16. Id. at 103-05, 174; Joyner, supra note 1, at 195.
17. NANDA & PRING, supra note 1, § 2.1.10, at 35.
18. See Goldie, supra note 1, at 80-81.
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Christopher Joyner argues that "vesting of rights in all of humankind"
is an element only of a radical form of the CH principle.19 Many
commentators, however, regard humankind's rights to the resources as
an essential characteristic of the CH principle.
Utilization: Peaceful Purposes. The International Law Association,
in its 1986 Seoul Declaration concerning the CH principle, does not list
"peaceful purposes" among the utilization features of a common
heritage regime. 20 Commentators have noted that "peaceful purposes"
could stand apart from the CH concept as a separate principle. 21
Utilization: Environmental Protection. The existence and
formulation of an environmental protection element of the CH principle
have been disputed. Professor R. St. J. McDonald does not consider
environmental protection an element. He finds that environmental
preservation is linked to "an obligation to leave a particular area in as
good a condition as the present generation received it," and believes
that "obligations on intergenerational rights and on environmental and
natural preservation" must await "a more mature" formulation of the
CH principle. 22 By contrast, Judge Riidiger Wolfrum finds that "the
interests of future generations have to be respected in making use of
the international commons," approaches environmental protection
through the lens of sustainable development, and considers "the concept
of sustainable development [to be] one of the important elements of the
common heritage principle." 23 However, Professor Duncan French
questions whether the concept of sustainable development applies to
common spaces, noting that "the generic idea of 'development' . . . has
generally been conceptually restricted to areas within a State's
territory, or at least its jurisdiction" and that Agenda 21 did not
mention the deep seabed when discussing sustainable development.24
Utilization: Benefit Sharing. Commentators dispute whether the
equitable sharing of benefits under the CH principle requires
19. Joyner, supra note 1, at 192-93.
20. See Declaration on the Progressive Development of Principles of Public
International Law Relating to a New International Economic Order § 7, in INT'L LAW
Ass'N, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SECOND CONFERENCE 8 (1987) [hereinafter ILA Seoul
Declaration].
21. BASLAR, supra note 1, at 106-07.
22. Macdonald, supra note 1, at 155.
23. Wolfrum, The Common Heritage of Mankind, supra note 1, T 22-23; see BASLAR,
supra note 1, at 103.
24. Duncan French, From the Depths: Rich Pickings of Principles of Sustainable
Development and General International Law on the Ocean Floor - the Seabed Disputes
Chamber's 2011 Advisory Opinion, 26 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 525, 535 (2011).
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preferential treatment for developing states. According to Wolfrum, de
facto equal participation "derives from the common heritage concept,
placing all States . .. on the same footing and accordingly benefitting all
States," but preferential treatment "favours only developing countries
and has its roots in the development aid philosophy."25 Joyner, arguing
that the CH principle includes the idea that "any economic benefits
derived from" efforts in a common space "would be shared
internationally,"2 6 also finds that giving a preference to developing
countries is an ideological gloss accepted only in some formulations of
the principle. 27
Common Management. If a common management or other
cooperative decision-making arrangement has not actually been
established, the question arises how a country should act in accordance
with the CH principle. Wolfrum concludes that each state must then
"decide how to ensure that activities subject to the principle are carried
out for the benefit of all mankind." To this end, each state retains
discretion "whether to attempt to achieve this objective by refraining
from unilateral, in favour of joint, activities, by seeking cooperation on a
bilateral or multilateral basis, or by distributing revenues or
information."2 8 However, the possibility that a state could comply with
the CH principle by unilaterally "distributing revenues or information"
raises questions about whether common management is an essential
element of the CH concept. For some, a procedural element of the CH
principle, requiring that exploration and exploitation of resources must
be managed under treaty-based mechanisms, may be more
controversial than a substantive requirement of some sort of sharing of
benefits.
Other Possible Elements. Joyner stresses that scientific research
"would be freely and openly permissible" under a CH regime, with
research results made available to those interested in them.29 This
assertion is consistent with the notion that the CH principle requires
25. Wolfrum, The Principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind, supra note 1, at 323.
26. Joyner, supra note 1, at 192.
27. See id. at 192-93.
28. Wolfrum, The Common Heritage of Mankind, supra note 1, 25 (emphasis
added). See Tullio Scovazzi, Is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea the Legal
Framework for All Activities in the Sea? The Case of Bioprospecting, in LAW, TECHNOLOGY
AND SCIENCE FOR OCEANS IN GLOBALISATION 309, 313 (Davor Vidas ed., 2010) (suggesting
that each state operating under a CH principle has the obligation, even absent
institutional direction, to ensure that knowledge resulting from marine scientific research
be disseminated). For discussion of the possible roles of states and international
institutions in managing different CH regimes, see Kiss, supra note 1, at 240-42.
29. Joyner, supra note 1, at 192.
2012 453
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
sharing benefits,30 but most commentators do not specifically include
scientific research as one of the features characterizing how a CH
resource or area must be utilized. Professor Kemal Baslar would add
the explicit requirement that "only those natural and cultural resources
which globally affect the survival and welfare of mankind can be
exploited, conserved or protected under the common heritage regime." 3 1
Others suggest that the "common concern" concept, important in
international environmental law, is distinct from and weaker than the
CH principle, not incorporating other elements of the CH principle. 32
In sum, one source of indeterminacy in articulating the CH
principle is disagreement about which elements comprise the CH
principle and how each should be formulated.
In addition, some words commonly associated with the CH
principle are themselves unclear. For example, what is meant by
"[hu]mankind"? Does this word encompass future generations? Does it
suggest that the CH principle embodies a type of human right? Or does
it include, along with states, only peoples and territories that are not
yet capable of self-governance? How broad is the definition of
"benefits"? Do the words "peaceful purposes" connote complete
demilitarization or simply limit uses of force to those that have been
recognized as legal in other contexts? The law is to some degree
inevitably indeterminate, 3 3 but typical formulations of the CH principle
on their face leave significant questions about its meaning.
The reason why the features I set out above are often associated
with the CH principle becomes clearer when we consider the context in
which the principle developed (outlined in Part III). These features also
may be found (albeit some of them in qualified form) in one part of the
treaty that implements the CH principle in the most detail, namely
Part XI of the LOS Convention as modified by the 1994 Implementation
Agreement. The terms of the LOS Convention and the Implementation
Agreement limit the indeterminacy of the CH principle as developed in
that treaty regime.
Finally, consider the third question: What is the legal status of the
CH principle? Where the CH principle has been included in a treaty
that has entered into force, states parties are of course bound by the
principle in the form incorporated in the treaty. Assertions about a
more universal legal status for the CH principle have varied widely.
30. See BASLAR, supra note 1, at 98.
31. Id. at 110.
32. Id. at 287-96; NANDA & PRING, supra note 1, § 2.1.10, at 35.
33. See John E. Noyes, Interpreting the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and Defining
Its Terms, in DEFINITIONS OF THE LAW OF THE SEA: TERMS NOT DEFINED BY THE 1982
CONVENTION 45 (George K. Walker ed., 2012) (discussing treaty interpretation and
indeterminacy).
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Some have argued that it sets out a fundamental and non-derogable
norm, constituting a jus cogens obligation.3 4 This assertion historically
seems linked to political efforts to promote the CH principle in the LOS
Convention, but today must raise eyebrows, especially outside that
context. Some have concluded that the principle has attained the
status of customary international law. The International Law
Association's 1986 Seoul Declaration, for example, provides that "[t]he
concept of the common heritage of mankind as a general legal principle
has entered into the corpus of public international law."35 Writing in
2009, Wolfrum also finds that "[t]he common heritage principle, as far
as the use of common spaces is concerned, is a part of customary
international law," constituting "a distinct basic principle providing
general . . . legal obligations with respect to the utilization of areas
beyond national jurisdiction."36  Others have found too bold the
assertion that the CH principle is established in customary
international law. For example, Joyner (although writing before the
1994 Implementation Agreement and the ensuing widespread
acceptance of the LOS Convention) concludes that the CH principle is
too indeterminate and too lacking in accompanying state practice and
opinio juris to have gained acceptance in customary international law.3 7
Even if one were to conclude that the principle today rises to the level of
customary international law, one would have to be open to the
possibility that some states may have persistently objected to applying
the principle in particular settings.
If not a principle of international law, the CH principle is left to the
realm of political or moral concept or non-binding soft law. Professors
Ved Nanda and George Pring accurately but cautiously report that the
CH concept "has received very favorable support from many expert
34. See, e.g., 14 THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
OFFICIAL RECORDS 16 ( 52, 58), 37 (1 93), 42 (T 6), 71 ( 145), 75 (1 6), U.N. Sales No.
E.82.V.2 (1980) (statements of representatives of India, Trinidad and Tobago, Argentina,
Iran, Jamaica, and Niger); see also BASLAR, supra note 1, at 365-67; Degan, supra note 1,
at 1373-74. For purposes of the LOS Convention, the CH principle is accorded special
prominence. The Convention provides that "States Parties agree that there shall be no
amendments to the basic principle relating to the common heritage of mankind set forth
in article 136 and that they shall not be party to any agreement in derogation thereof."
LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 311(6).
35. ILA Seoul Declaration, supra note 20, § 7.1; ILA New Delhi Declaration, supra
note 14, pmbl., at 24 (reaffirming the Seoul Declaration in 2002).
36. Wolfrum, The Common Heritage of Mankind, supra note 1, 1 25. See supra note
14 and accompanying text.
37. Joyner, supra note 1, at 197-99; accord Report of the Committee on Legal Aspects
of a New International Economic Order, in INT'L LAw ASSN, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SECOND
CONFERENCE 409, 469 (1987) [hereinafter ILA NIEO Report] (comments of Prof. D.H.N.
Johnson, remarking that "the concept of the common heritage of mankind ... is not yet a
principle of international law, let alone a basic one").
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commentators" and refrain from giving an opinion on its exact legal
status.3 8
With respect to one arena - the mineral resources of the seabed
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction - a decision maker could well
find that the CH principle represents customary international law. The
near-universal acceptance of the LOS Convention and the 1994
Implementation Agreement, 39 along with the practice of states and
international organizations concerning deep seabed minerals, 40 provide
evidence supporting customary international law status. However, the
exact content of such a norm is debatable: does it track the particulars
of the widely accepted 1994 Implementation Agreement 4' or instead
reflect more general standards?42
In sum, we are left with significant questions about the scope of
application of the CH principle, and especially about its elements and
legal status. Any decision maker faced with applying the CH principle
to a legal dispute would have considerable discretion in interpreting its
meaning and status. As discussed in Part IV, the LOS Convention
added some determinacy to the meaning of the CH principle for
purposes of that treaty. We may also obtain some clues about the
meaning and lasting influence of the CH principle - or any principle -
by paying attention to the context in which it developed. Part III
explores some of the important context related to the CH principle.
III. HISTORICAL AND ETHICAL CONTEXTS
The standard story of the CH principle begins with the undoubtedly
influential August 1967 speech of Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta to
the U.N. General Assembly. In that speech, Pardo asserted that "[t]he
seabed and the ocean floor are a common heritage of mankind and
should be used and exploited for peaceful purposes and for the exclusive
benefit of mankind as a whole." 43 More generally, Pardo also espoused
38. NANDA & PRING, supra note 1, § 2.1.10, at 35.
39. U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs,
Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and
the Related Agreements as at 03 June 2011, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference
files/chronological lists-of-ratifications.htm#The%/20United%/2ONations%/2OConvention%
20on%20the% 2OLaw%20f%2Othe%2OSea (last visited Dec. 10, 2011) (listingl62 parties
to the LOS Convention and 141 parties to the Part XI Implementation Agreement).
40. See infra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
41. See Louis B. Sohn, International Law Implications of the 1994 Agreement, 88 AM.
J. INT'L L. 696 (1994).
42. See Wolfrum, The Principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind, supra note 1, at
333-37.
43. Quoted in Brownlie, supra note 1, at 294; see U.N. GAOR, 1st Comm. 22d Sess.,
1515th mtg., at 1-15, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1515 (Nov. 1, 1967); U.N. GAOR, 1st Comm.,
22d Sess., 1516th mtg., at 1-3, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1516 (Nov. 1, 1967). Although Pardo's
invocation of the CH principle gained traction, work undertaken some forty years earlier
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an international oceans management regime responsible for a wide
range of oceans activities.44 Others articulated the CH principle in the
late 1960s as well. The World Peace Through Law Conference adopted
a resolution in July 1967 directed primarily at deep seabed resources,
but referring to "the high seas" as "the common heritage of all
mankind." 45 In a June 1967 speech, Ambassador Aldo A. Cocca of
Argentina, during deliberations of the U.N. Outer Space Committee,
argued that "the international community has endowed [a] new subject
of international law - mankind - with the vast [ ] common property" of
outer space. 46 Invocation of the CH principle in legal and political
forums coincided with proposals to exploit common space resources.
The perception that technology allowed, or might soon allow, the
exploitation of previously unobtainable common space resources, in
short, gave rise to proposals for new legal regimes to manage them.
The proposed CH regimes differed from regimes treating common
spaces as res communis, open to all, or res nullius, subject to occupation
and sovereignty.
Although these expressions of the CH principle were undoubtedly
important in pushing it onto the world political and legal stage, they
provide an overly narrow view of how and why the principle developed.
With any principle, it is important to try to identify its core underlying
values. When political formulations of a principle are linked to
longstanding values and traditions, the principle is more likely to
resonate with people and gain acceptance. A thorough investigation of
the values associated with the CH principle could fill at least a book,
but I note here a few pertinent points. The CH principle's antecedents
include the legal public trust doctrine and precepts of Roman law
applicable to common space resources. 47 A complete story of the origins
of the principle would also note its religious and natural law
in the League of Nations concerning living resources of the oceans had included similar
references. The League's Assembly appointed a Committee of Experts for the Progressive
Codification of International Law, which considered, inter alia, "[w]hether it is possible to
establish by way of international agreement rules regarding the exploitation of the
products of the sea." League of Nations Comm. of Experts for the Progressive Codification
of Int'l Law, Questionnaire No. 7 adopted by the Committee at its Second Session, held in
January 1926: Exploitation of the Products of the Sea, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. SPECIAL SUPP.
230, 230 (1926). The Rapporteur, Jose Le6n Suirez of Argentina, examined living
resources, finding that "[t]he riches of the sea, and especially the immense wealth of the
Antarctic region, are the patrimony of the whole human race." Jose Le6n Sudrez, Report
on the Exploitation of the Products of the Sea, in id. Annex 231, 236. See 1 PATRICIA
BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WHALING 109-13 (1985).
44. See Louis B. Sohn, Managing the Law of the Sea: Ambassador Pardo's Forgotten
Second Idea, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285, 289-91 (1997).
45. Wolfrum, The Principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind, supra note 1, at 315.
46. U.N. Legal Subcomm. of the U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outerspace,
75th mtg. at 7-8, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.75 (Nov. 13, 1967).
47. See BASLAR, supra note 1, at 65-68.
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underpinnings. For example, all religious traditions emphasize the
promotion of peace and the resolution of disputes without recourse to
violence.48  All religious traditions emphasize the importance of
generosity, of sharing wealth with the poor and unfortunate, even if
they have not "earned" that wealth. 49 Furthermore, Judeo-Christian,
Islamic, and Buddhist traditions support the notion of human
stewardship of the earth, with responsibilities for future generations. 50
It is, admittedly, a large step from the view that individuals have
certain moral responsibilities to the view that nation-states should
embrace them with respect to non-citizens. Nonetheless, the ideals of
peaceful resolution of disputes, sharing with the poor, and stewardship
of the earth for future generations persuaded religious leaders to
endorse the CH principle.5 1 Furthermore, the perceived benefits of the
principle for individuals have led some commentators to regard it as a
human rights principle. 52
A consideration of context reveals, then, two important
underpinnings of the CH principle. In general, aspects of the principle
coincide with long-held values. Second, political leaders articulated the
principle at a time in history when it was important to develop legal
guidance concerning common space resources.
The context in which the CH principle developed also helps explain
why its scope of application, content, and legal status have remained so
disputed. 53 No one global forum arrived at consensus on the meaning of
48. See, e.g., BRIAN D. LEPARD, HOPE FOR A GLOBAL ETHIC 145-49 (2005).
49. The Old Testament of the Bible calls on property owners to leave a portion of
their lands' production to "the alien, the orphan, and the widow." Deuteronomy 24: 19-21;
id. 15:7-8; Leviticus 19:10; Proverbs 25:21. In the New Testament, Jesus called on people
to share material wealth with the less fortunate (and to cultivate a rightness of spirit).
Matthew 5:42; Luke 18:22. The Koran describes "true piety" or "righteousness" as
encompassing the giving "of one's substance, however cherished, to kinsmen, and
orphans, the needy, the traveler, beggars.' Koran 2:177. The Bhagavad Gita, Buddhist
scriptures, Confucius's Analects, and Bahd'i readings also extol the virtues of generosity
and help for the needy. See LEPARD, supra note 48, at 45-49, 86-87.
50. See BASLAR, supra note 1, at 13-20.
51. See id. at 14-20; Borgese, supra note 1, at 1321-26.
52. See BASLAR, supra note 1, at 318-34; see also Ved P. Nanda, The Right to
Development: An Appraisal, in WORLD DEBT AND THE HUMAN CONDITION 41 (Ved P.
Nanda et al. eds., 1993) (reviewing individual human rights and collective aspects of the
right to development).
53. The U.N. General Assembly's 1970 Declaration of Principles, supra note 4,
focused only on deep seabed mineral resources, and its compromise language has been the
subject of much interpretive debate. See, e.g., Goldie, supra note 1, at 69-105. The
International Law Association, the world's foremost international non-governmental
organization devoted to the study and development of international law, adopted its Seoul
Declaration, supra note 20, two decades after the CH principle was articulated in various
forums on the law of the sea, outer space, and Antarctica; did so in an effort to promote
the "progressive development" of international law; and arrived at conclusions that were
immediately questioned. See ILA NIEO Report, supra note 37, at 411, 414-16, 469.
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this general concept early in its development. Much of the development
of the CH principle has been left to commentators who, as we saw in
Part II, often disagree about the principle's legal status and elements.
The indeterminacy surrounding the CH principle relates to the
political context of 1960s and 1970s. Debates over the CH principle
reflected deep-seated political tensions between Western developed
states and the Third World. In particular, developed and developing
states disagreed about whether rights to common space resources
should vest in all of humankind (rather than in whoever captured the
resource) and about whether benefits should be equitably distributed,
taking particular account of the needs developing states.5 '
Formulations of the CH principle that strongly emphasized the vesting
of rights in all of humankind and the distribution of benefits to
developing states were linked to the New International Economic Order
("NIEO") movement. In line with that movement, many developing
states criticized what they saw as Western economic exploitation.55 For
those states, the traditional law of the sea, based on high seas freedoms,
embodied such exploitation. Only developed states had the economic
wherewithal to send factory ships to fish freely off the coasts of
developing states, depleting coastal fisheries. Only maritime powers
had navies that could sail near the shores of developing states or
through their straits, posing security and environmental risks. The CH
principle as applied to deep seabed minerals - a principle incorporating
shared access to those common space resources, common management
responsibilities, and equitable distribution of benefits - was an antidote
to developed state privileges under the traditional law of the sea. In
Pardo's words:
We wanted dignity for poor countries and an end to
humiliating financial hand-outs, by giving even the poorest
54. In the mid-1960s and early 1970s, some Western leaders did in general terms
assert the need to respect the interests of all humanity in common spaces. For example,
in 1966 U.S. President Lyndon Johnson declared, "[w]e must insure that the deep seas
and the ocean bottom are, and remain, the legacy of all human beings." President Lyndon
Johnson, Remarks at the Commissioning of the New Research Ship, The
"Oceanographer," in 2 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 930, 931 (1966); see EDWARD WENK,
JR., THE POLITICS OF THE OCEAN 212-13, 258 (1972). Four years later, President Richard
Nixon issued a statement referring to deep seabed mineral resources as "the common
heritage of mankind," proposing "the collection of substantial mineral royalties to be used
for international community purposes, particularly economic assistance to developing
countries," and calling for "international machinery" to "authorize and regulate
exploration and use of seabed resources beyond the continental margins." President
Richard Nixon, Statement About United States Oceans Policy (May 23, 1970), reprinted in
2 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA: DOCUMENTS 751-52 (S. Houston Lay et al.
eds., 1973). These U.S. statements did not, however, fully embrace all aspects of the CH
principle.
55. See Larschan & Brennan, supra note 1, at 306-12.
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members of the international community the opportunity to
obtain access to marine technology at a tolerable cost and to
participate on a basis of equality in the management and
development of very significant resources.
Finally, we wanted radically to change the traditional law of
the sea which, we believed, reflected the interests of only a few
members of the international community. It certainly was not
in harmony with the ever more urgent need of cooperation in
addressing world problems, and for environmental sensitivity
and sustainable cooperative development of world resources. In
short, we wanted the common heritage principle to replace
freedom of the seas as the foundation of international law of the
sea. 56
If it proved impossible to extend the CH principle to all ocean
spaces, its application to deep seabed mineral resources could, in
Pardo's view, partially counterbalance navigational and other privileges
accorded maritime powers. The political tension between NIEO
proponents and Western leaders who resisted restrictions on free
enterprise and were skeptical of international bureaucracy shaped how
the CH concept was implemented in Part XI of the LOS Convention.
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE COMMON HERITAGE PRINCIPLE IN TREATY LAW
Legal principles have value even if left in general terms. Indeed, it
is not always desirable to convert broad principles into more concrete or
determinate rules. Principles of international law57 may fill gaps in
rules and provide decision makers with a guiding mindset - a reminder
of basic objectives of the law - when they interpret or apply rules.
Principles, when applied in good faith, also allow for, in David Caron's
words, "diversity within convergence."5 8 That is, they may accord
different states discretion to pursue a common objective in different
ways, in line with particular domestic political and legal arrangements.
56. Arvid Pardo, The Origins of the 1967 Malta Initiative, 9 INT'L INSIGHTS 66, 69
(1993). Pardo also acknowledged that Malta had certain selfish concerns at stake:
Government officials hoped that the initiative would bolster Malta's political standing
with other states, especially in the Mediterranean, and that Malta might become the
headquarters of a significant international institution. Id.
57. I refer to broad principles embodied in treaties and customary international law,
as well as to "general principles of law" derived from analogies to municipal law
principles.
58. See David D. Caron, Contemporary International Law Issues in the Asia Pacific:
The Importance and Challenge of the Difference Between Principles and Rules in
International Law 13, 2011 International Law Association Asia-Pacific Regional
Conference on Contemporary International Law Issues in the Asia Pacific: Opportunities
and Challenges, Taipei, Taiwan, May 2011, available at http://works.bepress.com/david
caron/118.
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A legal principle need not be incorporated in treaty law in order to have
significance. Indeed, even as soft law, political concept, or "emerging
customary international law," a principle may be used to influence
debates and shape legal developments.
However, the CH principle itself points towards its eventual
incorporation and elaboration in treaty rules. If there is to be "common
management" or at least some cooperative decision-making structure
concerning common space resources - one commonly listed element of
the CH principle - the managers must know the governing procedures.
If natural resources or other benefits are to be shared equitably, it will
be helpful to learn exactly what is to be shared and how distribution is
to take place. The uncertainty about elements of the CH principle,
noted in Part II, may suggest the desirability of more determinate
language to guide states and other actors operating under the principle.
To this end, the U.N. General Assembly's 1970 Declaration of Principles
concerning deep seabed mineral resources provided that "an
international regime . . . including appropriate international machinery
to give effect to [the Declaration's] provisions shall be established by an
international treaty of a universal character, generally agreed upon." 59
The International Law Association's 1986 Seoul Declaration indicated
that the CH principle was "to be specified by internationally agreed
regimes." 60
Indeed, a few treaties have incorporated the CH principle. The
Moon Treaty explicitly does so, 6 1 and also sets out in general terms
several elements commonly associated with the principle. Along with
these elements - no acquisition of sovereignty over the moon or its
resources, equal access for parties to the use and exploration of the
moon, a peaceful purposes provision, and the requirement to carry out
exploration of the moon "for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific
development" 62 - the Moon Treaty commits its parties "to undertake to
establish an international regime, including appropriate procedures, to
govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the moon as such
exploitation is about to become feasible." 63 However, Part XI of the
LOS Convention, which provides that "[t]he Area and its resources are
the common heritage of mankind,"64 along with the 1994
Implementation Agreement, which reaffirms the CH character of the
Area and its resources, 65 are the only international agreements that
59. Declaration of Principles, supra note 4, 1 9.
60. ILA Seoul Declaration, supra note 20, 7.1.
61. Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11(1).
62. Id. arts. 2, 4, 11.
63. Id. art. 11(5).
64. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 136.
65. Part XI Implementation Agreement, supra note 3, pmbl.
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have as yet developed detailed rules and procedures to implement the
CH principle. 66
The LOS Convention/1994 Implementation Agreement regime for
deep seabed mining has been analyzed in depth elsewhere.67 For
present purposes, two general points deserve emphasis. First,
negotiating compromises resulted in a regime that, broadly, leaves
states operating through the International Seabed Authority ("ISA" or
"Authority") to represent humankind, but, in its details, does not fully
reflect several elements commonly associated with the CH principle.
Second, the practice of states and international institutions has
reinforced at least some CH features of the LOS Convention/1994
Implementation Agreement deep seabed mining regime.
The 1982 Convention itself reflected compromises related to the CH
principle. In negotiating the Convention, the political tensions noted in
Part III of this essay were evident. First, the deep seabed mining
regime in Part XI of the LOS Convention formed part of a "package
deal." Many developed states did not truly embrace the CH principle,
but were willing to accept its application to the Area and its minerals as
part of a package, the price for assurances in the LOS Convention of
expanded navigational rights and limits on coastal state jurisdiction.
Second, Part XI in its original form did not fully incorporate the version
of the CH principle advocated by Pardo and many developing states.
For example, Part XI established a so-called parallel system, whereby
national or private companies could exploit seabed resources in one of a
pair of mining sites; the Enterprise, which is the mining arm of the ISA,
or a developing state could mine only the second site.68 This parallel
66. The CH principle has been discussed in conjunction with other treaties, but it is
debatable whether they implement the principle. Some features of the Antarctic Treaty
system, e.g., reserving the continent for peaceful purposes, protecting the environment,
and sharing the results of scientific research, reflect elements of the CH principle.
Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 72. However, other features
appear incompatible with the CH principle, notably claims to sovereignty, a ban on
mineral exploitation (rather than exploitation with equitable distribution), and
management by only some parties to the Antarctic Treaty (rather than global common
management). See BASLAR, supra note 1, at 243-76; Guntrip, supra note 1, at 404-05. A
few other treaties also contain language that broadly echoes the CH principle. See
Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage pmbl., Nov. 16,
1972, 1037 U.N.T.S. 240 (referring to cultural and natural heritage sites as "the heritage
of all the nations of the world"); Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
pmbl., Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (referring to outer space as the "province of all
mankind"). These treaties do not elaborate a detailed regime for common management or
for equitable distribution of benefits.
67. For an introduction to the deep seabed mining regime, see LOUIs B. SOHN,
KRISTEN GUSTAFSON JURAS, JOHN E. NOYES & ERIK FRANCKX, LAW OF THE SEA IN A
NUTSHELL 339-45, 351-60 (2010).
68. See LOS Convention, supra note 2, Annex III, arts. 3, 8-9.
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system undercut the equitable distribution or resource-sharing aim of
the CH principle with respect to a significant portion of seabed
resources. 69 Overall, the meaning of the CH principle, which is not
defined in Article 136 of the LOS Convention, was linked to particular
treaty provisions. According to the influential Virginia Commentary,
the meaning of "'common heritage of mankind' . . . for the purposes of
the Convention can be derived from other provisions of Part XI."'0
The 1994 Implementation Agreement reflected a changing global
political situation. Developed states refused to accept the LOS
Convention because they opposed its deep seabed mining provisions; the
United States under the Reagan administration was the most vocal
opponent of those provisions. Developing states agreed to changes that
benefited developed states and incorporated market-oriented features
into Part XI. Many developing states were, by the end of the twentieth
century, less enamored of NIEO precepts than they had been a few
decades earlier, and the Preamble to the 1994 Part XI Implementation
Agreement explicitly "note[s] the political and economic changes,
including market-oriented approaches, affecting the implementation of
Part XI."1 States agreed on changes necessary to persuade developed
states to accept the LOS Convention just months before it was due to
enter into force in November 1994. These changes are set out in the
Implementation Agreement and its Annex, which are "interpreted and
69. However, other LOS Convention provisions - e.g., requiring the transfer of
technology to developing states, obligating mining companies to pay significant fees to
assist with the Authority's expenses, and requiring parties to the Convention to fund the
mining activities of the Enterprise or provide it with technology - could have a
redistributional effect. See id. Annex III, arts. 5(1), 13, Annex IV, art. 11(3).
70. 6 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY I
136.8(a) (Satya N. Nandan ed., 2002) (emphasis added). The Commentary then
summarizes some of the relevant provisions of Part XI, section 2 of the LOS Convention:
[N]o state may claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over the
Area (article 137(1)); rights to the resources of the Area are vested in
humankind as a whole and may not be alienated (article 137(2)); activities in
the Area are to be carried out for the benefit of humankind as a whole,
"irrespective of the geographical location of States, whether coastal or land-
locked" (article 140(1)); financial and other economic benefits derived from
activities in the Area are to be shared equitably (article 140(2)); the Area is
to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and can be used by all States
without discrimination (article 141); and States have a responsibility to
protect the marine environment from harmful effects that may be caused by
activities in the Area (article 145). In addition, the principle of the common
heritage of mankind requires that the interests and needs of developing
States, and especially the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged
among them, be taken into particular consideration in the conduct of all
activities undertaken in the Area (e.g., articles 140(1), 143(3)(b), 144 and
148).
Id.
71. Part XI Implementation Agreement, supra note 3, pmbl.
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applied together" with Part XI of the LOS Convention "as a single
instrument."72
The Implementation Agreement differed significantly from Pardo's
original vision of a CH regime. Some provisions, for example, affect the
goal of equitable distribution of benefits: provisions for the mandatory
transfer of technology to developing states "shall not apply";73 the
Enterprise is to operate through joint ventures in accordance with
"sound commercial principles," and the requirement that States Parties
fund the Enterprise "shall not apply";74 any state on the Authority's
Finance Committee, which would include the United States should it
become a party to the LOS Convention, could block financial
distributions.7 5 Other changes call into question whether the Authority
is to be operated under a true common management system: any one of
four chambers of states, each composed of states with similar
characteristics (including a chamber of developed states), may block
actions of the Authority's Council;76 LOS Convention provisions for a
Review Conference that might have resulted in amendments to Part XI
binding on parties even without their consent "shall not apply."77 One
commentator has concluded that the 1994 Implementation Agreement
pays "mere lip-service to [the CH] principle" and that the Agreement
and its Annex "have destroyed [the principle's] substance as defined in
the 1970 Declaration [of Principles]." 8 The U.S. view was that "the
common heritage principle fully comports with private economic
activity in accordance with market principles." 79
Despite these assessments, however, traditional elements of the
CH principle remain in place. As a formal matter, the 1994
Implementation Agreement did not change basic features of the CH
concept set out in the LOS Convention's Part XI, section 2 - e.g., the
prohibition on sovereign claims, the basic provision concerning the
72. Id. art. 2(1). Provisions of the Implementation Agreement prevail "[i]n the event
of any inconsistency" between the Agreement and Part XI of the LOS Convention. Id.
73. Id. Annex § 5.
74. Id. Annex § 2.
75. See id. Annex § 9(3), (7)-(8).
76. Id. Annex § 3(9)(a), (15)-(16).
77. Id. Annex § 4.
78. Degan, supra note 1, at 1374; accord Anand, supra note 1, at 16-18.
79. United States: President's Transmittal of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea and the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI to the U.S.
Senate with Commentary, 34 I.L.M. 1393, 1429 (1995). For an excellent overview of the
Part XI Agreement, see Bernard H. Oxman, Law of the Sea Forum: The 1994 Agreement
on the Implementation of the Seabed Provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea,
88 AM. J. INT'L L. 687 (1994). Professor Oxman concludes that "[t]he 1994 Agreement
substantially accommodates the objections of the United States and other industrial
states to the deep seabed mining provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention." Id. at 695;
see also Anand, supra note 1, at 16-17 ("The international community bent backwards to
make sure that Washington was satisfied and got all it wanted and more.").
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equitable sharing of benefits, the peaceful purposes provision, and the
requirement to protect the marine environment.80 Furthermore, states
and the ISA have reinforced aspects of the CH principle.81 By operating
continuously under the LOS Convention/1994 Implementation
Agreement, states and the ISA have, for example, emphasized that the
Area is not subject to claims of sovereignty. The Authority's mining
codes and contracts with miners mandate protections for the marine
environment, one component of a CH regime. 82 The CH notion of
sharing benefits is reflected in Authority-sponsored marine scientific
research concerning the Area, the results of which are widely
distributed.83
In practice, no state is actively pursuing any alternative deep
seabed mining regime. Although the U.S. Code still provides for a
registration mechanism for U.S. nationals involved with deep seabed
mining initiatives, 84 U.S. companies have essentially abandoned any
such initiatives.85  Activity is taking place only under the LOS
Convention/1994 Implementation Agreement regime. Parties to the
LOS Convention apply to the ISA, on their own behalf or by sponsoring
their nationals, in order to undertake mineral exploration, prospecting,
and eventually exploitation, and miners enter into contracts with the
Authority for those purposes. 86 The possibility of a competing deep
seabed regime appears extremely remote, and any such regime would
surely be condemned as inconsistent with international law.87 The LOS
Convention/Part XI Implementation Agreement regime has become the
"only game in town."
80. See Part XI Implementation Agreement, supra note 3, pmbl.; LOS Convention,
supra note 2, arts. 136-49; supra note 70.
81. In applying the core elements of the CH principle as set out in the LOS
Convention, the Authority is called on to take into account not only the interests of States
Parties but of all states. LOS Convention, supra note 2, pmbl.
82. See Int'l Seabed Auth., Decision of the Assembly of the International Seabed
Authority Relating to the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic
Sulphides in the Area, ISBA 16/A/12 (May 7, 2010); Int'l Seabed Auth., Decision of the
Assembly of the International Seabed Authority Relating to the Regulations on Prospecting
and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area, ISBA/6/A/18 (Oct. 4, 2000).
83. See Int'l Seabed Auth., http://www.isa.org.jmlen/scientific (last visited Jan. 17,
2012); Satya Nandan, Administering the Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed, in THE
LAW OF THE SEA: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 75, 91-92 (David Freestone et al. eds., 2006).
84. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-73 (2011).
85. See SOHN ET AL., supra note 67, at 360.
86. For an overview of the Authority's activities, see Int'l Seabed Auth., Report of the
Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority Under Article 166, Paragraph 4,
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISBA/17/A/2 (June 13, 2011).
87. E.g., L.D.M. Nelson, The New Deep Sea-Bed Mining Regime, 10 INT'L J. MARINE &
COASTAL L. 189, 202 (1995) (concluding that widespread acceptance of the 1994
Implementation Agreement means the position that "deep seabed mining is a freedom of
the high seas" is "no longer tenable").
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Another institutional actor has also significantly reinforced the CH
underpinnings of the Part XI/Implementation Agreement regime. In
May 2010, in response to a request by Nauru, the ISA's Assembly asked
the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea ("SBC" or "Chamber") to issue an advisory opinion on three
questions concerning, to quote the name of the case, "Responsibilities
and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with respect
to Activities in the Area." 88 In the resulting unanimous opinion, which
the Authority's Council and Assembly in turn noted with appreciation,89
the SBC discussed several emerging aspects of the principle of
sustainable development, including them within the parameters of
sponsoring states' obligation of due diligence; these aspects have a
bearing on how duties of environmental protection concerning the Area
are to be carried out.90 The Chamber also explicitly highlighted aspects
of the CH principle as set forth in the deep seabed treaty regime. The
Chamber reiterated that the LOS Convention sought to 'contribute to
the realization of a just and equitable international economic order
which takes into account the interests and needs of mankind as a whole
and, in particular, the special interests and needs of developing
countries, whether coastal or landlocked,"' concluding that various
Convention articles "require effective implementation with a view to
enabling the developing States to participate in deep seabed mining on
an equal footing with developed States."91 The "role of the sponsoring
State," the SBC found, "is to contribute to the common interest of all
States in the proper implementation of the principle of the common
88. According to Article 191 of the LOS Convention, the SBC "shall give advisory
opinions at the request of the Assembly or the Council on legal questions arising within
the scope of their activities." LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 191. More particularly,
the three questions concerned: 1) the content of the obligations and responsibilities of
sponsoring states under the Part XI LOS Convention/1994 Implementation Agreement
regime; 2) the extent of liability of sponsoring states should a sponsored entity fail to
comply with its undertakings; and 3) the measures a sponsoring state must take to fulfill
its responsibilities under the LOS Convention. Responsibilities and Obligations of States
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17,
Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M. 455, 1 1 (2011) (Seabed Disputes Chamber of
the Int'l Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, 2011).
89. Int'l Seabed Auth., Statement of the President of the Council of the International
Seabed Authority on the Work of the Council During the Seventeenth Session 8,
ISBA/17/C/21* (July 21, 2011); Int'l Seabed Auth., Decision of the Assembly of the
International Seabed Authority Relating to the Advisory Opinion of the Seabed Disputes
Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on Matters Relating to the
Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to
Activities in the Area 2, ISBA/17/A/9 (July 25, 2011).
90. According to some commentators, the concept of sustainable development
underpins the environmental protection aspects of the CH principle. See Responsibilities
and Obligations 117-20, 136-37; see also French, supra note 24, at 538-44.
91. Responsibilities and Obligations 163 (quoting LOS Convention, supra note 2,
pmbl).
466 VOL. 40:1-3
THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND
heritage of mankind."92 The Chamber also determined that "obligations
relating to preservation of the environment . . . in the Area" have an
".erga omnes character," suggesting that the obligations are applicable to
all humankind. 93
The advisory opinion also highlighted compliance mechanisms that
could help specify rights under this erga omnes notion. The SBC
suggested that the Authority itself - by virtue of its implied powers
under Article 157(2), for the LOS Convention itself is silent on the point
- may make a claim for compensation for "damage to the Area and its
resources constituting the common heritage of mankind, and damage to
the marine environment."9 4 Furthermore, "[e]ach State Party may also
be entitled to claim compensation" for breach of these erga omnes
obligations. 95 Other actors that could make claims include "entities
engaged in deep seabed mining, other users of the sea, and coastal
States."96 These claims need not be relegated to diplomatic protests.
Article 187 of the LOS Convention, concerning the jurisdiction of the
SBC in contentious cases, provides one avenue of recourse for States
Parties, the Authority, or contractors with respect to breaches by
sponsoring states. The SBC's opinion reinforces the notion that the
Area and its resources are part of the common heritage of humankind.97
Although the ISA may challenge actions of sponsoring states that
violate CH requirements in the Area, it lacks the authority to challenge
coastal states' maritime boundaries that affect the size of the Area. The
Area is bounded by coastal states' continental shelves, and in many
regions the outer limits of the shelf extend beyond 200 nautical miles
from baselines. Coastal states themselves set the outer limits of their
continental shelves, the general criteria for which are specified in
Article 76 of the LOS Convention. Coastal states with outer limits
beyond 200 miles from baselines also must submit data to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf ("CLCS"), a
technical body established by the Convention, and limits established
"on the basis of' CLCS recommendations "shall be final and binding."98
Although outer limits lines affect the extent of the Area and hence
where the CH principle applies, Article 187 limits the jurisdiction of the
SBC in contentious cases to disputes involving "activities in the Area";
this limitation precludes the Authority from challenging the legality of
92. Id. 1 226.
93. Id. 1 180.
94. Id. J 179-80.
95. Id. 1 180.
96. Id. 1 179.
97. For discussions of the SBC's advisory opinion, see David Freestone, International
Decision, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 755 (2011); French, supra note 24, at 544-46.
98. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 76(8). For a brief overview of Article 76 and
the CLCS process, see SOHN ET AL., supra note 67, at 306-17.
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continental shelf outer limits set by a coastal state. 99 In addition, the
ISA's Council or Assembly probably could not request an advisory
opinion from the SBC on the legality of the location of an outer limits
line. 00 The potential thus exists for coastal states to assert "creeping
jurisdiction" against the Area, 101 and the international community has
not provided effective legal mechanisms to challenge such
encroachment. Despite this limitation, however, the international
institutional mechanisms governing deep seabed mining can, as noted
above, help to reinforce precepts of the CH principle established in the
LOS Convention/1994 Implementation Agreement regime.
V. THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON HERITAGE PRINCIPLE
What lies ahead for the CH principle? It is useful to break this
inquiry into more specific questions. First, what of the principle's
application in the treaty regime governing deep seabed mining? Treaty
provisions, such as those in the LOS Convention/1994 Implementation
Agreement, may cure much of the indeterminacy associated with the
principle and create specific CH regimes. Widespread acceptance of a
treaty may also bolster support for the CH principle as a norm of
customary international law. As discussed in Part IV of this essay, the
LOS Convention/Implementation Agreement regime - our only example
of a widely accepted treaty regime specifically incorporating the CH
principle - appears stable, despite the United States not being a party.
Indeed, the practice of states and international institutions operating
under this regime reinforces the CH principle as applied to deep seabed
mining.
Second, does the CH principle, as set out in Article 136 of the LOS
Convention, apply to non-mineral activities on the seabed beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction? Article 136, after all, applies to "the
Area" as well as to its mineral "resources." Some have argued that such
features of the Area as deep-sea hydrothermal vents (and perhaps their
living resources, prized for biotechnology) are subject to the CH
principle.102 Others contend that such resources are instead governed
99. See John E. Noyes, Judicial and Arbitral Proceedings and the Outer Limits of the
Continental Shelf, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1211, 1239-40 (2009). The LOS Convention
defines "activities in the Area" as "all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the
resources of the Area," and "resources" in the Area are in turn defined in terms of mineral
resources. LOS Convention, supra note 2, arts. 1(1)(3), 133(a).
100. See Noyes, supra note 99, at 1256-58.
101. Franckx, supra note 1, at 566-67.
102. See Alex G. Oude-Elferink, The Regime of the Area: Delineating the Scope of
Application of the Common Heritage Principle and Freedom of the High Seas, 22 INT'L J.
MARINE & COASTAL L. 143, 174-75 (2007).
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under other legal regimes, including the high seas freedom of fishing. 103
The ISA is not authorized directly to regulate deep-sea vents, for its
mandate is limited to particular functions concerning mineral
"Cresources" and mining-related "activities in the Area." 104 It seems
quite possible that in trying to fashion a legal regime applicable to
living resources at deep-sea vents, political tensions similar to those
attending the negotiation of the deep seabed mining regime may
surface. Any generally accepted regime for managing issues arising in
the Area other than seabed mining must await an agreement, the
details of which appear unlikely to reflect the CH principle in any
"pure," Pardo-esque form, if at all. 105
Third, what of the CH principle's future with respect to areas other
than the deep seabed? What can it contribute to other common space
regimes? Here again, political opposition to the redistribution and
common management prongs of the CH principle persists. It may well
be difficult to incorporate the redistribution element of the principle,
which links to NIEO goals, into any generally accepted global legal
mechanisms. Although the Moon Treaty explicitly references the CH
principle, widespread acceptance of a more detailed international legal
regime governing the moon and its resources could depend on
jettisoning or redefining the CH principle.
None of this is to say that all the values underlying the CH
principle have become unimportant. Its core values surface in other
declarations and legal principles. Some elements of the CH principle -
for example, reserving the area in question for peaceful purposes -
restate values found in the U.N. Charter, other basic international law
documents, and moral and religious traditions. The environmental
protection component of the CH principle is now reflected in many
principles of international environmental law, often under the rubric of
sustainable development. The work and structures of regional fisheries
management organizations suggest international policy makers
recognize that common management mechanisms, or at least some type
of cooperative arrangements, are necessary to conserve and manage
common space living resources. In short, many values associated with
the CH principle continue to find expression, sometimes in modified
form, in other international law principles and arrangements.
The controversial equitable redistribution or benefit-sharing
element of the CH principle may, however, be too closely linked to the
103. See Craig H. Allen, Protecting the Oceanic Gardens of Eden: International Law
Issues in Deep-Sea Vent Resource Conservation and Management, 13 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REV. 563, 632-36 (2001).
104. See Oxman, supra note 79, at 688-89.
105. For discussion of one possible regulatory model, see Scovazzi, supra note 28, at
314-15.
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NIEO movement to gain acceptance in new treaties or general
international law. This element of the CH principle is in large measure
a product of the political climate of the 1960s and 1970s.106 However,
benefit sharing reflects, broadly, a concern with development and the
needs of developing states that continues to be recognized in many
international law and soft law instruments. For example, the concept
of common but differentiated responsibilities has been incorporated in
some treaties, reflecting the concern that many developing states
require additional time or resources in order to contribute on the same
basis as developed states to amelioriating international environmental
or common space problems.107 Similar sentiments underlie the
numerous international efforts at capacity building. Although capacity
building and common but differentiated responsibilities concern
developed states' obligations, they also reflect the needs of developing
states. Many policy makers may argue that redistributing the proceeds
of resource exploitation is not the best way to further development in
Third World states. But many also recognize that it is difficult to
achieve a stable and just world without such development, and they
search for alternative modalities toward that end. Ved Nanda has
written wisely that the underpinnings of an asserted right to
development include "enhanc[ing] the human condition, recogniz[ing]
basic needs, and foster[ing] participatory and sustainable
development."1 0 8 Even if the world is unwilling to embrace direct
wealth redistribution, as Pardo envisioned in his formulation of the CH
principle, the goal of development remains to be addressed through
other mechanisms.
In sum, the CH principle incorporates several norms that have
been recognized elsewhere, including reserving an area for peaceful
purposes, environmental protection or sustainable development, and
cooperation in the management of common space resources. The most
controversial aspect of the CH principle, involving the equitable sharing
of benefits, may not survive in new contexts. But other principles,
international instruments, and international arrangements have
recognized the development needs of people in developing states.
International lawyers and policy makers are of course concerned
about much more than the abstract meaning of principles and the
identification of their underlying values. They also engage with process
who decides, in what forum, about interpreting and applying
principles and rules - and with compliance mechanisms. The fully
106. See Franckx, supra note 1, at 566 n.139.
107. See Duncan French, Developing States and International Environmental Law:
The Importance of Differentiated Responsibilities, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 35 (2000).
108. Nanda, supra note 52, at 42; see also Ved P. Nanda, The Right to Development
under International Law-Challenges Ahead, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 431 (1985).
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operational deep seabed mining regime of the LOS Convention/1994
Implementation Agreement provides one example of international
dispute settlement processes and compliance-enhancing mechanisms
addressing common space and international environmental issues.
Observers may well evaluate this regime in terms of its real-world
contributions to sensible environmental protections, the fostering of
marine scientific research, and the avoidance of conflicts in exploring
for and exploiting deep seabed minerals. The fact that the deep seabed
mining regime formally embodies the CH principle may prove less
significant than the regime's concrete achievements concerning various
specific goals that the world recognizes as essential.
